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ABSTRACT
Information security is very important in today’s society. Computer intrusion is one type of security infraction that poses a threat to all of us. Almost every
person in modern parts of the world depend upon automated information. Information systems deliver paychecks on time, manage taxes, transfer funds, deliver
important information that enables decisions, and maintain situational awareness
in many diﬀerent ways. Interrupting, corrupting, or destroying this information
is a real threat. Computer attackers, often posing as intruders masquerading as
authentic users, are the nucleus of this threat. Preventive computer security measures often do not provide enough; digital ﬁrms need methods to detect attackers
who have breached ﬁrewalls or other barriers. This thesis explores techniques to
detect computer intruders based upon UNIX command usage of authentic users
compared against command usage of attackers. The hypothesis is that computing
behavior of authentic users diﬀers from the computing behavior of attackers. In
order to explore this hypothesis, seven diﬀerent variables that measure computing
commands are created and utilized to perform predictive modeling to determine the
presence or absence of a attacker. This is a classiﬁcation problem that involves two
known groups: intruders and non intruders. Techniques explored include a proven
algorithm published by Matthius Schonlau in [17] and several predictive model variations utilizing the aforementioned seven variables; predictive models include linear
discrimination analysis, clustering, kernel partial least squares learning machines.

viii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Statement of the Problem
Security poses a problem for today’s society. Numerous threats from our envi-

ronment aim to breach security, and since 9-11, the importance of vigilant security
measures has escalated. There is a very serious threat that exists today that is silent,
virtually transparent, and seemingly anonymous; this threat is computer intrusion.
Society today depends on an uninterrupted ﬂow of vital information. Malicious attackers intend to stop, interrupt, and alter this ﬂow of information. As society grows
increasingly reliant on computers, the importance of computer security grows.
There are numerous techniques used to enhance the security of information
and computers. Many of these techniques attempt to block or deter attackers,
preventing them from intruding in the ﬁrst place. These techniques include many of
our everyday encounters such as user-accounts and passwords, ﬁrewalls, and VPN
encryption. All of these techniques aim to keep the wrong people out and the right
people in. However, attackers continually strive to break through these barriers and
invade protected information. These barriers are preventive measures, and digital
ﬁrms must augment these preventive measures by implementing intrusion detection
systems (IDS) that monitor the network and detect fraudulent or unusual activity.
This thesis explores a computer security problem known as host based intrusion
detection, and in particular, masquerade detection. This is a binary classiﬁcation
problem that involves authentic users and low instances of masqueraders posing
as authentic users. Utilizing captured command usage logs of UNIX users, statistics that measure these commands serve as a platform for classiﬁcation. Some of
the statistics created included recent published methods by other researchers, and
several of the statistics are novel. The goal of this thesis involves:
1. Replicating work performed by other researchers with this data to capture
proven successful techniques and statistics for the masquerade detection problem.
2.

Merge these successful proven statistics with independently developed
1
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statistics and explore interaction with multivariate statistics.
3. Applying proven cutting edge supervised classiﬁcation models to achieve
superior classiﬁcation rates.
The purpose of a host based IDS is to detect malicious use of user privileges,
often detected as novelties or anomalies. Certain characteristics of computer IDS
deﬁne their eﬀectiveness. The typical measures of an IDS involve accuracy of detection, often expressed as a true positive rating and false positive rating. The overall
eﬀectiveness of an IDS can be shown on a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve, which will be explained later in detail. A typical problem with intrusion
detection involves minimizing false positive alarms while maintaining an acceptable
rate of true positives. For example, if an IDS identiﬁes 50% of users as intruders,
but less than 10% of those identiﬁed are actual intruders, the digital ﬁrm will investigate the activities of one half of all users and consider suspending user accounts
until the investigation is complete. Examining 50% of all user activities and creating frustration for 50% of all users is not acceptable for most digital ﬁrms, realizing
that only a fraction of the 50% are attackers. Minimizing false positive ratings is a
key criterion when evaluating an IDS, even while realizing that a lower true positive
rating will occur.
Intrusion detection is inherently a statistical problem [5]. The problem involves
collecting a sample of data, describing the data through statistical attributes, and
then classifying the data based upon these attributes. Oftentimes intrusion detection
involves identifying intruders without any training data and without any indication
of their intrusion technique. The brand of intrusion detection explored in this project
is driven by developing proﬁles of authentic users and developing methods to detect
anomalies based upon a stream of new data that may or may not be from the
authentic user. If the attributes of the new stream of data signiﬁcantly strays from
a particular user’s typical patterns of behavior, then the models explored should
indicate an intruder.

3

1.2

Recent Work
Schonlau et. al. [5, 6, 7, 17, 16] conducted the original work with the data

examined in this thesis. Their contributions included a thorough analysis of several statistical techniques for identifying masqueraders. Schonlau et. al. explored
approaches that include: Bayes one-step Markov model, hybrid multistep Markov
model, text compression, Incremental Probabilistic Action Modeling (IPAM), sequence matching, and a uniqueness algorithm[5]. Schonlau stressed the importance
of minimizing false positives, setting a goal of 1% or less for all of his classiﬁcation
techniques. Schonlau’s uniqueness algorithm, explained in [17], achieved a 40% true
positive rating before crossing the 1% false positive boundary. Wang [19] used oneclass training based on data representative of only one user and demonstrated that
it worked as well as multi-class training. Coull [4] applied bioinformatics matching
algorithm for a semi-global alignment to this problem. Lee [12] built a data mining
framework for constructing features and model for intrusion detection.
Roy Maxion contributed insightful work with this data that challenged both
the design of the data set and previous techniques used on this data [14, 13]. Maxion
uses a 1v49 approach in [14], where he trains a Naive Bayes Classiﬁer one user
at a time using the training data from one user as true negative examples versus
data from the forty-nine other users (hence 1v49) as true positive (masquerader)
examples. Maxion claimed the best performance to date in [14], achieving a true
positive rating of 60% while maintaining a false positive rating of 1% or less. Maxion
also examines masquerade detection with a similar data set that contain command
arguments in [13].
1.2.1

The Necessity to Investigate Supervised Learning Approaches for
Intrusion Detection
The research documented in this thesis diﬀers from the abovementioned au-

thors for several reasons. The prediction model or learning machine used for our
experiments is Rosipal’s Kernel Partial Least Squares (KPLS) [15]. As the title indicates, it is based upon the partial least squares techniques popularized in chemometrics. KPLS is an extremely eﬃcient learning machine, especially for high dimensional
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data, but it only applies to the supervised learning domain. The existing literature
that explores the Schonlau et. al. (SEA) dataset exclusively considers unsupervised
learning. Intrusion detection, and masquerade detection, should be considered as
both a supervised and unsupervised learning problem. Supervised and unsupervised
learning represent two domains of learning theory that should contribute and provide synergy to each other. The criticism for using supervised learning for intrusion
detection, speciﬁcally in the masquerade detection scenario, is that we never know
what the masquerader actually does, so it is impossible to train with true positive
examples. The SEA dataset, along with other masquerade detection datasets that
were constructed in a similar fashion, is a complete anomaly to this criticism. The
SEA dataset utilizes surrogate masqueraders. The masquerading incidents within
the SEA test data are nothing more than commands taken from another user’s
stream of authentic, non-malicious commands and probabilistically inserted (at a
very sparse rate) in place of another user’s authentic commands. Therefore, this
dataset does not contain authentic masquerading data. The SEA dataset shortcomings also include a lack of context over objects as indicated by Maxion in [13].
However, the extensive research based upon this dataset proves that the SEA data
poses a non-trivial problem. The underlying assumption surrounding the examination of these surrogate masqueraders is that techniques that work well with these
surrogates should extend into the real domain.
The argument behind using a supervised learning approach with this dataset
ties directly to this assumption. An assumption is that simulating true positive
examples, or using existing true positive examples from this data set for training is
valid. Therefore, I propose that a supervised learning machine can and should be
applied with this data.
1.2.2

Schonlau’s Analysis
Matthius Schonlau is the researcher who created the dataset analyzed in this

thesis. Schonlau developed, analyzed, and compared numerous detection algorithms
which have already been mentioned.
Particular attention is given to the uniqueness algorithm (which is based on
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unpopular commands)[17], replicating this technique with several programs written
in perl. Following the work of Schonlau accomplished two critical goals: by replicating his work and achieving the same results through new text mining programs,
a validity check for the programs is accomplished. Secondly, his work with this
dataset is comprehensive, and understanding and replicating his work provides a
solid foundation of knowledge that enables further exploration of this dataset.
Shortly after ﬁnishing the initial programming and validity check with Schonlau’s algorithm based upon unpopular commands[17], new techniques were explored.
It is possible to measure this data in numerous ways and provide quantities that a
learning machine can use to predict outcomes. After creating a new set of variables
that measure user behavior, these variables serve as a basis for experimentation
in predictive modeling with learning machines. The learning machine utilized in
this article is Rosipal’s K-PLS[15]. With numerous combinations of variables presented to the learning machine with diﬀerent preprocessing techniques, exploration
of improved classiﬁcation begins.

CHAPTER 2
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
2.1

Understanding the Dataset
Understanding the structure of the data is necessary before any programming

or initial analysis can be conducted. Schonlau collected this data from an AT&T
lab in New Jersey, observing the computing behavior of 50 users. The data set
consists of 50 users with each user contributing a stream of 15,000 truncated UNIX
commands. The user’s data stream is further divided into blocks of 100 commands,
thus creating 150 blocks of commands for each user. The ﬁrst 50 blocks of data is
training data only (contains no masquerading data), and the remaining 100 blocks
of data contains masquerading data that appears based on a probability. Given
that there are 50 users, this implies that in total there are 5,000 tuples of data
in the non-intruded initial set and 10,000 tuples of data that potentially contain
intrusion data. Since the true outcome of each of these subsequent 10,000 tuples
is known, understand that there are only 256 intruded tuples. Only 2.56% of the
data contains intruders, which makes this a very diﬃcult problem. It is a very
unbalanced classiﬁcation problem. The objective is to determine if a block of data
contains masquerading data or not.
The initial programming eﬀort involved determining the data dictionary (list
of every unique command). In addition to generating this list, the programs also
report the frequency of the commands and the popularity of the commands (number
of users who use distinct command). In an eﬀort to validate the data dictionary,
frequency, and popularity of the commands, I relied upon a graph that plots distinct
commands vs. unique commands[17] and collaboration with Yongqiang Zhang based
upon his work in [18].

6
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Figure 2.1: I plotted the above left graph based upon results from Perl
programs that develop the data dictionary, frequency, and
popularity of the commands (based upon all 50 users). The
above right graph comes directly from Schonlau’s analysis of
the data[17]. As you can see, these two graphs (for approximately 50 users) are virtually identical.
The above graphs illustrate the uniqueness (1 - (total users of that command
/ total users)) of the distinct commands. As you can see, almost 50% of the distinct commands have a uniqueness of .98, meaning that almost 50% of the distinct
commands are used by only one user. In addition to gleaning this useful analysis
describing the popularity of the commands, replicating Schonlau’s graph reinforces
the validity of the Perl programs. In total, there are 856 distinct commands within
the entire data set, and within the training data set (ﬁrst 5000 commands for each
user) there are 635 distinct commands.

2.2

Schonlau’s Algorithm
Now that the structure of this data is understood, this section will explain

how Schonlau utilized some of the variables and properties mentioned above to
predict intrusion or non intrusion for each test data tuple[17]. He utilizes a creative
algorithm for this. The algorithm truly formed the basis for this project, providing
an example of a successful technique that predicts the presence or absence of an
intruder.
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K
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Wuk (1 −
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where the weights Wuk are
⎧
⎨
Wuk =

where vuk =

vuk
vk

if user u’s training data contains command k

⎩ −1 otherwise
Nuk
Nu

and vk =


u

vuk

Table 2.1: Description of Schonlau’s variables
Name of Variable
Nu
nu
Nuk
nuk
U
Uk
K

Description
Number of commands in training data (5000)
Number of commands in test data (100)
Number of times user uses command k in training data
Number of times user uses command k in test data
Number of users (50)
Number of users who use command k
Number of distinct commands in training data (635)

A toy problem illustrating this algorithm is in Appendix A. The algorithm
computation follows:
1. Preprocess the training data (initial 5000 commands from each user) to
determine number of distinct commands, uniqueness of each command (number of
users who use command k), and command frequency for population and each user.
2. For each tuple of test data, calculate xu value (intruded data should score
close to -1, authentic data close to 1).
3. Determine acceptable threshold (between -1 and 1) and calculate confusion
matrix.
This technique is fundamentally diﬀerent from typical machine learning methods; it is simply a fancy statistic. This technique calculates a test statistic xu ,
which is based upon command history and uniqueness properties of the commands
in the dataset. Schonlau utilizes both the command usage history of the particular
user and the entire population to predict on the test data. The ﬁrst 5000 tuples of
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data are training data, and there is no intrusion present. This is the data utilized
to develop the data dictionary, uniqueness, and frequencies. When the xu value is
calculated for a tuple of test data, the algorithm relies upon the uniqueness and frequency of commands seen from both the user and the population to determine each
summed value. Unique commands never used by the user tend to drive the summation towards -1, where commands that are typical of the user drive the summation
towards +1.
The algorithm achieves exceptional results considering the unsupervised nature
of the learning. In order to better understand the algorithm and the dataset, I wrote
several perl programs that created the necessary data dictionary and executed the
above algorithm.
These programs will generate the xu value, a number between -1 and 1 for each
stream of 100 commands. The total output is an array of 5000 numbers between -1
and 1 (50 users, each user has 100 data-blocks (100 commands each) of test data,
thus an array of length 5000). Based upon the algorithm, a user whose data-block
contains commands similar to those used in the training data will tend to score
high, whereas a data block containing commands previously unused by the user
(especially if unpopular) will tend to score negative values. Once the array of 5000
test statistics is built, a single classiﬁcation threshold can be determined in order
to develop a confusion matrix. If the test statistic is less than the threshold, the
program predicts an intruder; if the statistic is above the threshold, the program
predicts no intruder. Figure 2 illustrates three diﬀerent confusion matrices produced
by the program that analyzes the 5000 test statistics.
The confusion matrix shows the performance of the IDS at a particular operating point, however an ROC curve is necessary to illustrate the overall performance
of the IDS. In order to build the data for an ROC curve, the technique utilized generated results for 1600 incremental values of the classiﬁcation threshold (increments
of .001 from -.89 to .7). This essentially generated 1600 confusion matrices, and
when listed in an array format one can easily calculate points along the ROC curve
for the system. The below ROC curves represent the results of two algorithms that
I analyzed (the second algorithm is a very slight modiﬁcation of the original).
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Figure 2.2: The confusion matrices shown above were generated by a Perl
program that analyzes the 5000 test statistics. From top to
bottom, the corresponding classiﬁcation thresholds are -.3,
-.25, and -.28.
ROC curves measure the false positive rating vs. the true positive rating (see
Appendix B). In order to compare two ROC curves, the area under the curve (AUC)
represents the comparative measure. Since an ROC curve represents a classiﬁcation
system, the AUC is a comparative measure for several classiﬁcation systems. The
AUC is an overall performance measure of a classiﬁer, however it is important to
understand that minimal false positives is paramount with IDS. I will illustrate with
the best ROC curve attained that the AUC is equivalent to Schonlau’s uniqueness
algorithm AUC, however a false positive rate of 0 is maintained for much higher
true positives. This indicates a better classiﬁer. The next section describes the
development of new variables that describe user behavior and explores the statistical
nature and predictive power of these variables.

2.3

Programming in Perl
Several programs written in perl enabled the analysis of this dataset. perl is

designed to manipulate and mine textual data, which was ideal for this dataset.
There are six programs that formed the basis for the analysis of this dataset. Each
user’s commands existed in a single ﬁle, and the Perl programs opened these ﬁles and
extracted the statistics necessary to describe user behavior and perform predictive
modeling. The ﬁrst program, dictionarytrain, analyzes the initial 5000 commands
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Figure 2.3: The above ROC curves represent results from the Perl programs written to execute and analyze the performance of
Schonlau’s uniqueness algorithm which is based on unpopular commands.
of each user and creates a data dictionary of distinct commands. The program also
determines the overall frequency an popularity of commands. The program called
user popularity determines the number of times each user utilized each distinct
command. There is also a program that calculates Schonlau’s algorithm, and this
program titled algorithm debug creates a ﬁle that contains the xu value for the 5000
tuples of test data. The next step involves analyzing the xu values, the the program
results analysis debug calculates the confusion matrices and the true positive / false
positive ratings necessary to build the ROC curve. Chapter 3 discusses several
new variables introduced to provide further insight and explore the possibility of
building a more powerful prediction model. There are two programs that support
the analysis of these new variables, titled features and 601features. The below ﬁgure
illustrates the ﬂow of data and through the Perl programs, and Appendix C contains
the source code of these programs.

12

RAW DATA
50 different files, each containing 15,0000 truncated Unix commands from a single
user, provide the raw data necessary to begin the analysis. The first 5,000 commands
of each file are known to be authentic, however the last 10,000 commands could
contain the presence of an intruder.

PREPROCESSING
The dictionarytrain program reads every file and creates an output file that contains a
dictionary of distinct commands and the frequency and popularity of each distinct
command. The userpopularity program determines the number of times each user
utilized each distinct command.

CALCULATING SCHONLAU’S ALGORITHM
The algorithm_debug program calculates
Schonlau’s algorithm, producing an xu value for
each of the 5000 tuples of test data. The
results_analysis_debug program calculated the
confusion matrices and true positive / false
positive ratings to build an ROC curve.

PREDICTION MODELING WITH NEW
VARIABLES AND A K-PLS LEARNING
MACHINE
The programs titled features and 601features
calculate variable for newly created variables, built
largely from the statistics produced by
dictionarytrain and userpopularity, and creates
output files in MetaNeural format prepared to feed
into the Analyze software for prediction modeling
using a K-PLS learning machine.

Figure 2.4: Flow chart of Perl programs

CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF NEW
VARIABLES
3.1

The New Variables
After validating the Perl programs and developing a solid understanding of the

dataset, new variables were necessary to create diﬀerent techniques that accurately
predict the presence or absence of an intruder. Several of these variables are also
utilized in Schonlau’s algorithm, but generally in a diﬀerent manner. These variables
were created with the goal of developing a technique to measure the behavior of
computer users in a manner that captures the diﬀerences between intruders and
authentic users. There are a number of techniques available to capture computer
user behavior and/or network behavior. This technique is largely a function of the
dataset utilized. Remember that the dataset contains truncated UNIX commands
collected from ﬁfty diﬀerent users. Out of the 15,000 commands contributed from a
user, the ﬁrst 5,000 commands are untouched and the latter 10,000 contain intrusion
data based upon a low probability. The new variables and the prediction models
involving these new variables work primarily with this latter 10,000 commands from
each user. Therefore, with each user contributing 100 tuples of data for this section,
there are a total of 5,000 tuples that we will examine. Typically, these 5,000 tuples
will be scrambled, divided into a training set and test set, and fed into a learning
machine. These new variables we are discussing measure the overall characteristics
of the 100 commands contained within the tuple, and these variables can be seen in
Table 1.
An important aspect that remained true throughout the search for eﬀective
classiﬁcation involved the importance of Mahalanobis scaling the data - essentially
normalizing every entry in the data matrix - subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation of the variable. This was due to the extreme ranges
of diﬀerent variables; with similar reasoning, the covariance matrix provides little
useful information, however the correlation matrix provides a true measure of the
13
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Table 3.1: Description of new variables

1
2

Name of Variable
% of Unix commands
% Top 20 most popular commands

3

% of internet commands

4

Average Uniqueness

5

Average Frequency

6

% of foreign commands

7

xu value

Description
Percent of commands that are Unix
Fraction of commands that are within the
top 20 most popular commands in the data
set
Fraction of commands that are internet/email commands (sendmail and
netscape)
Averages Uniqueness (number between .02
and .98 ) for entire data set
Averages the frequency of each command
in the dataset
Percent of commands never seen before this will be zero for all training data
xu value from Schonlau’s algorithm[17], essentially providing a signature index that
is based upon usage pattern of that particular user

interaction between variables.

3.2

Correlation Matrices
The correlation matrix is a scaled representation of the covariance; correlation

is the scaled linear association between two variables eliminating the impact of units
of measure. The correlation matrix shows that there is a deﬁnite relationship between the ”% foreign commands” and the ”% of UNIX commands” since the value of
this coeﬃcient is very close to -1. One other pair of variables, ”% Top 20” and ”Average Frequency”, were highly correlated at a value of .7. In order to create a physical
representation of the correlation matrix, an option in Analyze(computational intelligence software package written by Professor Mark Embrechts, RPI) produced
the below colored representation of the correlation matrix. The highly correlated
variables - coeﬃcients that take on values close to 1 and -1 - were represented as
darker colors, while the uncorrelated variables - coeﬃcients that take on values close
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to zero - were represented as light colors such as white. The software created a color
coded matrix that was mostly light colored with a couple spots of darker colors,
conﬁrming the numerical observations of the correlation coeﬃcients.

Correlation Matrix

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1
1
0.214
0.047
0.243
0.196
-0.998
0.018

2
0.214
1
0.298
0.391
0.686
-0.202
0.178

3
0.047
0.298
1
0.154
0.341
-0.049
-0.117

4
0.243
0.391
0.154
1
0.47
-0.245
-0.196

5
0.196
0.686
0.341
0.47
1
-0.194
0.056

6
-0.998
-0.202
-0.049
-0.245
-0.194
1
-0.011

7
0.018
0.178
-0.117
-0.196
0.056
-0.011
1

Figure 3.1: Numerical and Colored Correlation Matrices

3.3

Color Description of Variables
It is sometimes possible to predict a response directly from the values of the

variables, without any learning machine or algorithm.
Computer Intrusion Detection Data

Fisher’s Iris data

Figure 3.2: Colored Description of Variables
If a variable takes on a certain range of values for one response, and a separate
range for another response, it is sometimes possible to infer with a good degree of
certainty the response based on a single variable or multiple variables that have this
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property. ”Fisher’s Iris data” is a great illustration of this point. Four predictor
variables - petal length, petal width, sepal length, and sepal width are used to
determine the type of iris. The Analyze software package is used to color code
observations from the dataset.
In the Iris dataset it is apparent that the sepal length and width (ﬁrst two
variables) cannot be used to determine the type of iris since the colors do not
have a distinct similarity with those in the response column. On the other hand,
the colors generated for the petal length and width are distinctly similar to the
response column. So we can say that petal length or petal width can be used to
fairly accurately predict the type of iris. The computer intrusion dataset was sorted
by the ”Intrusion/ Non-Intrusion” column and color coded in the same way as the
Iris data set. These new variables introduced for the computer intrusion detection
problem do not exhibit this type of behavior.
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3.4

Principal Component Analysis
The primary purpose of principal component analysis is to determine the util-

ity in reducing the variables into linear combinations that explain the majority of
variance from the dataset; this is essentially a technique in reducing dimensionality.
Additionally, one can observe that principle components often naturally segregate or
cluster groups within the data. This natural clustering or grouping was the purpose
behind the principal component analysis conducted on this data set. It is possible that the score plot of the principal component loadings from a data set would
naturally discriminate. Unfortunately, this phenomenon did not occur. As seen in
the below graphs, the intrusion points (red) are centered near the centroid of all
points. These plots do not provide good discrimination between intrusion and non
intrusion.

Figure 3.3: Principal component score plots for the 1st PC vs 2nd PC
and 1st PC vs 3rd PC. Red dots indicate intruders, blue dots
are authentic users.

3.5

Linear Discrimination Analysis
Prediction modeling was the next eﬀort to follow the initial exploration of the

data. An obvious technique to explore for the classiﬁcation of two groups from a
multivariate data set is discrimination analysis. We explore discrimination analysis
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as a ﬁrst step in prediction modeling of this data. If a simple linear discrimination
model can suﬃciently predict the groups of this data set, there may be no need
to explore further. Secondly, linear discrimination analysis could expose characteristics of this data not seen before. Linear discrimination analysis proved more
eﬀective than quadratic discrimination analysis, with linear discrimination analysis
consistently providing superior true positive and false positive rates. This is likely
due to the fact that although the correlation matrices of these two groups are not
identical, they are similar enough to gain signiﬁcant predictive power through linear
discrimination analysis. The linear discrimination rule can be succinctly stated as
follows[11]:
Let x¯1 represent the mean vector of intruded training data, and let x¯2 represent
the mean vector of non intruded training data. Allocate test data tuple x0 to non
intrusion if:
1
−1
−1
(x¯1 − x¯2 )T (Spooled
)x0 − (x¯1 − x¯2 )T (Spooled
)(x¯1 − x¯2 ) ≥ ln w
2

(3.1)

where
w=

cost(1|2) probability(no intrusion)
cost(2|1) probability(intrusion)

The general procedure for applying this discrimination rule involves utilizing
a training set to develop the mean vectors and the pooled correlation matrix. The
classiﬁcation step proceeded with introducing a tuple from the test data and applying the above rule. The results from testing 1000 tuples of test data produces
a confusion matrix, essentially itemizing the number of correct classiﬁcations vs.
incorrect classiﬁcations in accordance with the groups. The below ﬁgure illustrates
and example of a confusion matrix. (note: we use a binary value to denote an intruder or non intruder; a binary value of 0 represents no intrusion, where a value of
1 represents an intruder).
This particular confusion matrix represents the performance of the linear discrimination analysis when the probabilities for each type of group are equal (.5 for
each group). We’ll explain the signiﬁcance of examining multiple ranges of proba-
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pred 0

pred 1

act 0
act 1

799
21

TP%
FP%

0.416667
0.171162

165
15

Figure 3.4: Confusion matrix for Linear Discrimination Analysis
bilities below. The above confusion matrix captures an important result from the
classiﬁcation procedure: it enables the calculation of true positive and false positive
which forms the basis for comparing classiﬁcation systems. We deﬁne true positive
as correctly classifying an intruder (predict 1 when actually 1), and a false positive
is deﬁned is incorrectly classifying a non-intruder (predict 1 when actually 0).
The above discrimination rule enables classiﬁcation for a certain operating
point, where the costs and probabilities are ﬁxed. However, comparing classiﬁcation systems at one operating point does not provide suﬃcient comparison. The
performance of classiﬁcation systems must be considered across a suﬃcient range of
operating characteristics, providing a thorough representation of the systems performance. Therefore, the range of consideration could be explored by varying the
probability of intrusion and probability of no intrusion. Changing these probabilities by subtracting .1 from one and adding .1 to the other produced changes in the
confusion matrix; this essentially changes the tolerance of the test, allowing analysis
across a range of operating points. The result of this range of operating points is
a Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve, or ROC curve, that plots false positive
on the x axis and true positive on the y axis. Plotting the operating characteristics
of several confusion matrices produces an ROC curve as shown below. A common
method of evaluating a classiﬁcation system is to measure the area under the curve
(AUC).
The area under the curve for the Linear Discrimination Analysis classiﬁcation
system is .702, which illustrates an eﬀective classiﬁcation system. Throughout this
report the area under the curve will serve as a measure to compare alternative
classiﬁcation systems.
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ROC Curve for Discriminant Analysis (AUC = .702)
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Figure 3.5: ROC Curve for Linear Discrimination Analysis

3.6

Clustering
Clustering is a technique commonly used for more than two groups or when

the number of groups is unknown. However, due to the nature of clustering (determining a measure or method to separate groups), clustering can serve as an eﬀective
tool for discrimination. An initial clustering attempt applied K-means clustering to
this data set, however poor results occurred. The next technique explored involved
distance comparisons, using distance to the centroid of each group as a similarity
measure. An initial attempt comparing Euclidean distances to the centroid of each
group produced an interesting result that is commonly known as the curse of dimensionality. Every point in this seven dimensional hyperspace was almost equidistant
from another point! The next obvious step involved reducing dimensionality by
choosing only two variables that produced a good clustering of the groups. Through
trial and error, we determined that the variable measuring the percent of internet
commands and the xu value from Schonlau’s algorithm produced good separation
between the groups. Euclidean distance measurements provided adequate classiﬁ-
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cation, however Minkoski’s equation for distance provided the best classiﬁcation,
utilizing a value of 5 for m. For each tuple of data in the test data, we measure
Minkoski’s distance to the centroid observed in the training data, and classify into
the group that measures the closest[11].
p

d(x, x̄no int ) = [
|xi − x̄no int |m ]1/m

(3.2)

i=1
p

d(x, x̄int ) = [
|xi − x̄i nt |m ]1/m

(3.3)

i=1

The above equations represent Minkoski’s distance equation, where x̄int represents the centroid of intrusion training data, and x̄no int represents the centroid of
non intrusion training data. p is the number of variables measured (p = 2 provided
the best results).
Once again, it was important to collect a range of values for this classiﬁcation
tool in order to evaluate overall performance of the system. In order to obtain a
range of confusion matrices, we introduced an oﬀset value. Initially, if d(x, x̄int )
represents the distance between a test data point and the centroid of intrusion data,
if d(x, x̄int ) was greater than d(x, x̄no int ) then the decision rule was to classify the
point as a non intruder. However, by introducing an oﬀset variable w, the new
rule assigned a point as a non intruder if d(x, x̄no int ) < d(x, x̄no int ) − w, where w
ranged from .2 to 1.2. This range of values for w produced an array of confusion
matrices, again providing a method of plotting an ROC curve. The ROC curve for
our clustering analysis with Minkoski’s distance metric is shown below.
The area under the curve is .722, which shows a slight improvement from
our discrimination analysis. Of particular interest in this ROC curve is the very
steep slope for small values of the false positive. An important aspect of computer
intrusion detection involves minimizing false positive. A false positive indicates that
some authentic user has been targeted as a attacker. The implications of this could
involve temporary suspension of user privileges until the situation is resolved or the
employment of manual inspection to determine the accuracy of this classiﬁcation
(most intrusion detection systems pass all reports of an intruder on to an employee
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Minkoski Distance Clustering (AUC = .722)
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Figure 3.6: ROC Curve for Clustering with Minkoski’s Distance Metric
who manually inspects the case; a high number of false positives is costly for this
reason).

CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION OF KERNEL PARTIAL LEAST
SQUARES
4.1

Kernel Partial Least Squares
Partial Least Squares Regression (PLS) was conceived by the Swedish statis-

tician Herman Wold for econometrics modeling of multi-variate time series[20]. The
ﬁrst PLS publication was a sociology application in 1975[21]. His son, Svante Wold,
applied PLS to chemometrics in the early eighties [23, 22] and currently PLS has
become one of the most popular and powerful tools in chemometrics, mainly because
of the quality of building models with many variables. PLS is not easy to explain
and the mathematics involved is far from transparent. Partially for that reason PLS
has a low emphasis in mainstream statistics and machine learning.
KPLS is a technique that has grown from partial least squares analysis. The
study of partial least squares(PLS) is similar to principal components analysis
(PCA).
PLS analysis considers the response vector (or matrix for multiple responses),
typically denoted as Y. PLS regression is a technique that maximizes latent variable
correlation with the response vector. Therefore, the ﬁrst latent variable (which is
again a linear combination of the input variables), possesses maximum correlation
with the response variable while remaining orthogonal to the remaining latent variables. Since the ﬁrst few partial least squares components or latent variables capture
the majority of correlation with the response variable, powerful prediction models
result with desirable dimension reduction properties.
Rosipal explains in [15] how to extract these PLS components. Utilizing the
NIPALs approach, this is the algorithm that Rosipal discusses:
1. randomly initialize u
2. w = XT u
3. t = Xw, t ← tt
23
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4. c = YT t
u
5. u = Yc, u ← u

6. continue to repeat steps 2-5 until t and u converge within a speciﬁed
tolerance.
7. deﬂate X,Y:
X ←X−ttT X
Y ←Y−ttT Y
After step 7, the ﬁrst PLS component is found and the next PLS component
can be extracted from the deﬂated X and Y matrices using the same algorithm.
At each full iteration (completion of step 7), store the t,u,w and c vectors.
These vectors will create matrices T,U,W and C which will be used to complete
the PLS regression model. Writing the typical regression model as
Y = XB +F
where B is our regression matrix and F is the residual matrix, Rosipal shows
in [15] the following:
B = XT U(TT XXT U)−1 TT Y
The key to Kernel PLS (KPLS) is realizing the kernel matrix formed in the
algorithm shown above between steps 2 and 3. The algorithm for KPLS is no
diﬀerent than what is shown for the PLS algorithm, except steps 2 and 3 combine
to create:
t = φφT u, t ← tt
φ represents the nonlinear function, or kernel function, that transforms the
input variables into feature space. φφT is the well known kernel matrix. KPLS
provides the attractive aspect of feature reduction while also combining the powerful
similarity technique that exists within nonlinear kernels. Our typical choice for the
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kernel function is the gaussian kernel, deﬁned as:
K(xi , xj ) = e

xi −xj 
2σ 2

The free parameter σ is necessary with this kernel, requiring minimal tuning.

4.2

Seven Feature Model
The analysis of the new variables in chapter 3 provides insight into the relation-

ship between the variables and the descriptive power of these variables. Exploring
fundamental properties such as correlation, principal components, and colored descriptive plots often reveals dynamics amongst the variables that is simple but not
intuitive or obvious. If a response could be predicted simply from one variable or
a linear combination that reduces dimensionality, there is no need to use learning
machines - it is a simple problem. Unfortunately, this is not a simple problem.
Further analysis is required.
The Analyze T M software package is the primary vehicle for analysis from this
point forward [8]. Previous analysis and preprocessing utilized Perl programs and
some simple spreadsheet calculations, however now that all of the variables have been
produced and represented in the MetaNeural format required by Analyze T M Analyze,
predictive modeling can begin.
The most obvious method for prediction modeling given the set of new variables described is to simply represent each tuple of data with a combination of these
seven variables. Let us call this the seven feature model. This is the initial approach.
The ﬁle to be processed by the learning machine contained 5000 tuples of data, each
containing 7 feature variables, the outcome (0 for non intrusion, 1 for intrusion),
and an identiﬁcation number. The identiﬁcation number is a six digit number that
uniquely identiﬁes each tuple. Here is an example of a tuple of preprocessed data:
% Top 20
most
popular
commands
0.61

% internet
commands

Average
uniqueness

Average
frequency

% of
foreign
commands

XU

Intrusion/Not
Intrusion

ID#

0

0.8549

6309.74

0

-0.2784

0

143101

Figure 4.1: A example tuple of preprocessed data with the new variables
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One ﬁnal crucial step in data preprocessing consisted of the scaling of the data.
During the previous discussion of principal components and the correlation matrix,
I indicated that the relationship between variables is much more meaningful with
scaled data. Learning machines also require scaled data to extract meaning and accurately learn and predict. Each variable, to include the response, was Mahalonobis
scaled. After scaling the variables, the ﬁnal step involved splitting the data into a
training and testing set (4000 tuples were used for training, 1000 tuples for testing),
and then the learning machines processed the information. Once the raw data is in
MetaNeural format, Analyze operators perform and provide the scaling, splitting,
and predictive modeling, and all necessary analytical results.
The ROC curve for the seven feature model is illustrated below. The AUC is
.907.

Figure 4.2: The ROC curve for the seven feature model. The AUC is
.907.

4.3

601 feature model
In addition to the seven feature model, I expanded the detail of the features in

an attempt to improve the prediction. Each variable in the seven feature model is
an average or percentage for the entire tuple of 100 commands considered. The only
exception to this is the xu value, which is a measure of the entire tuple. Therefore,
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each command can be represented by six diﬀerent values, each value representing
variables one through six. The result of this approach is a tuple of 601 features (the
extra feature is Schonlau’s xu value). The results of this 601 feature model were
surprisingly not better than the seven feature model. The 601 feature model was
cumbersome because of its size, required a much longer processing time, and did
not predict as well. I have two educated guesses why this model did not predict as
well:
1. Consider each variable as some type of random variable that could be
modeled with a probability density function. The original seven feature
model contained averages and percentages - a function of a summation
of each variable for each command of the tuple of 100 commands. This
average or percentage represents a statistic, and it is likely that these
statistics are functions of suﬃcient statistics, which implies that regardless of how the observations are manipulated, further information
regarding the true parameters of the underlying probability density
functions that form these statistics cannot be obtained. Therefore,
improvement is not an option if the variables calculated are already
functions of suﬃcient statistics. The theory of suﬃcient statistics is
addressed in [1]
2. This ﬁle is too large and cumbersome for the KPLS learning machine.
There is a curse of dimensionality. When the dimensionality grows too
large, classiﬁcation becomes very diﬃcult because every tuple becomes
equally dissimilar. Reduced and meaningful dimensions provide much
more predictive power.
The discussion of the performance of Rosipal’s KPLS with these two models
introduces again the topic of the σ tuning parameter. This parameter greatly impacts the performance. This model utilizes Gaussian kernels. The Gaussian kernels
represent a dissimilarity measure as seen in the below equation.
kij ≡ e−

xj −xl 2
2σ 2

(4.1)

The σ value in this equation is a tuning parameter - it needs to be adjusted to
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create optimal performance. The tuning of this σ value proved critical for achieving optimal performance with Rosipal’s KPLS learning machine. Consider the 601
feature model. Rosipal’s KPLS achieved a number of diﬀerent values as I modiﬁed
the sigma value. The below table illustrates the impact of tuning sigma with all
other conditions remaining constant. The table shows a range of sigma values and
the observed AUC of the ROC curve.
Table 4.1: Illustration of the impact of the sigma value against the performance of the learning machine, measured here through the
AUC
σ value
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
15
30
100
500

Area under the curve (AUC)
.6505
.7036
.7084
.6954
.7443
.7738
.6956
.7383
.7658
.7653
.7545
.7745
.7379

Although this table illustrates only integer values for sigma, sigma can actually
take any real number value. The purpose of the table is to illustrate the impact of
changes in sigma. The table also illustrates how much worse the 601 feature model
performed vs. the seven feature model. As you can see, the best AUC for the 601
feature model was .7745.

4.4

IMPROVING THE MODEL
The previous analysis indicates that KPLS is a robust learning machine that

captures all of the relevant information presented by the variables, regardless of
the form of the variables presented. This is similar to the logical argument regard-

29

ing suﬃcient statistics previously mentioned. In order to improve the performance
of the model, the data needed to improve with the addition of relevant variables
that uncover information that is not contained in the previous variables. Two new
variables are presented.
A simple transition probability matrix model can be constructed to capture
the likelihood of a user transitioning from one command to the next based upon
previous behavior. For every user, given that there are 635 distinct commands, a
transition matrix, T ∈ R635×635 , is created. Allowing tij to represent the ith row and
j th column, this value is equivalent to the probability of transitioning from the ith
command to the j th command. Given the k th test tuple of l = 1...100 commands,
the probability can be calculated as the following:

Pk =

100


tl where tl = tij when i = l − 1, j = l

(4.2)

l=1

For each test tuple we calculate this variable that we will refer to as the
transition variable. This variable is diﬀerent from previous variables created in that
it measures patterns; the order of the commands presented matters.
The other variable created is a very simple measurement inspired by the xu
variable. Referred to as the new variable, it is a count of how many new commands
are in the test tuple that have never been used by the user. Ranging from 1 to 100,
this variable has a surprising predictive power.
This variable by itself performs better as a single scalar predictor than any
of the previously mentioned techniques with the exclusion of the xu variable. This
certainly reinforces the cliche of “garbage in - garbage out”. However, it is interesting
to see what occurs when this variable is combined with the others. The AUC
jumps to .95, which is equivalent to the xu variable, however notice the value of the
true positive axis when the false positive rate increases from 0. The true positive
rate is slightly greater than .7 at this point. This illustrates the caution that is
necessary when considering the AUC as the overall performance measure. The
AUC is largely considered the best scalar performance measure for binary classiﬁers
[2, 9]. However, caution must be taken before selecting this as the one and only
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Figure 4.3: ROC curve illustrating the predictive power of solely the new
variable
measure of performance. If minimizing false positives is important, a false positive
boundary can be chosen, such as FP = 1% as indicated by Schonlau in [5]; the
IDS is measured by the true positive rate that it achieves before crossing the false
positive threshold of 1%.
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Figure 4.4: ROC curve of the performance achieved using every available
variable

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1

Conclusion
This thesis addresses a unique dataset that provides opportunity for the appli-

cation of data mining, statistics, and state of the art learning methods. Fundamental theoretical concepts of multivariate statistics have been discussed, and advanced
learning methods such as Kernel Partial Least Squares demonstrated remarkable
performance. Regardless of the models utilized and manipulation of statistics, it
was also reinforced that independent statistics with strong correlation with the dependent variable consistently improve the model. The ROC curve is an invaluable
tool for the measurement of an IDS. It is an elegant, concise description of performance. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is an excellent scalar measurement of
the performance of a binary classiﬁer, however the AUC has limitations. Two curve
of equivalent AUC may not represent equivalent classiﬁers in the eyes of a decision
maker. If maximizing performance in the low false positive range is a priority, or
perhaps maximizing true positives is a priority as it is in the medical ﬁeld, other
metrics must be considered.
The signiﬁcance of research in this ﬁeld expands well beyond the digital realm
and computer intrusion detection. Intrusion detection is a security problem. This
security could involve an airport, a national asset, vital infrastructure, or even the
physical borders of our country. Every day Americans spend millions of dollars to
secure their way of life, and this research presents innovative techniques to provide
enhanced security. Although the vehicle of this research involves computer intrusion
and attackers, these same techniques could be generalized to enhance the security
of any important resource.

5.2

Future Work
An approach yet to be explored extensively involves combining several ROC

curves in an attempt to achieve a synergistic eﬀect that results in optimal perfor32
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mance beyond the capabilities of any single classiﬁcation system.
1

TRUE POSITIVE

An overall
system of IDS
that generates
a synergistic
curve from
component
systems.

FALSE POSITIVE

1

Figure 5.1: The above graph represents three ROC curves. The two black
curves are component algorithms or component systems, and
the dashed ROC curve represents a system that combines the
component systems and generates a synergistic eﬀect with
improved performance.
The above illustrated approach diﬀers from several alternatives that have been
explored by others. This chart, showing multiple ROC curves and an optimal synergistic ROC curve, represents a proposal to search for an optimal classiﬁcation system
by combining several systems. The vehicle for this research is intrusion detection
systems, however the potential application is much broader.
Utilizing multiple IDS to devise a superior hybrid system is not a new idea.
Tom Fawcett and Foster Provost explored the concept of an ROC convex hull. This
approach essentially maps several ROC curves onto one graph, and depending upon
the tolerance accepted by the digital ﬁrm, the optimal operating position is derived
from the convex hull of the ROC curves [10]. Huseyin Cavusoglu, Birendra Mishra,
and Srinivasan Raghunathan also analyze several IDS as an overall system, and
they describe optimal operating conditions based upon variables devised from a
game theory approach[3]. This game theory approach views the digital ﬁrm and the
attacker partaking in a game where they each stand to gain or lose, and based upon
the cost beneﬁt ratio of both the digital ﬁrm and the attacker, there is an optimal
operating condition for the overall system. Both of these approaches mentioned
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above combine IDS algorithms in a parallel fashion, which diﬀers from the in series
approach that I will take. Several IDS algorithms placed in series could also be
viewed as several ﬁlters placed in series. Each ﬁlter will classify data, but subsequent
ﬁlters will only classify data passed from previous ﬁlters. Any ﬁlter has the authority
to classify data as containing negative intrusion and authentic, and if this is the case
that user is classiﬁed as authentic and will not be analyzed any further. However, if
a ﬁlter classiﬁes data as containing an intruder then the next ﬁlter will also analyze
this data.
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APPENDIX A
Tutorial in Calculating the xu Value
A.1

A Toy Problem with Five Commands
The calculation of Schonlau’s xu is not entirely intuitive. It is also helpful to

discuss why this statistic is so powerful for anomaly detection and exactly where this
predictive power is contained. In chapter 2, we presented the xu value as follows:
K
1 
Uk
Wuk (1 −
xu =
)nuk ,
nu k=1
U

(A.1)

where the weights Wuk are
⎧
⎨
Wuk =

where vuk =

vuk
vk

if user u’s training data contains command k

⎩ −1 otherwise
Nuk
Nu

and vk =


u

vuk

Table A.1: Description of Schonlau’s variables for Toy Problem
Name of Variable
Nu
nu
Nuk
nuk
U
Uk
K

Description
Number of commands in training data (5000)
Number of commands in test data (5)
Number of times user uses command k in training data
Number of times user uses command k in test data
Number of users (50)
Number of users who use command k
Number of distinct commands in training data (635)

Now let us consider an example that contains only ﬁve commands in the test
tuple, as reﬂected above. These commands are cpp, sh, xrdb, cpp, sh, in that order.
There are three distinct commands within these ﬁve, and we can begin to calculate
the necessary variables as shown in ﬁgure A.1.
In calculating Wuk , notice that the behavior of the other users inﬂuences the
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calculation. This is shown in ﬁgure A.2. This is a consistent theme with Schonlau’s
uniqueness approach. The power of the approach comes from measuring one users
behavior not only against her own previous behavior but also against the behavior
of the population. A strong penalty occurs if a command that has never been used
by a user appears in the test data. We will see in step three how this penalty is
magniﬁed or dampened depending on the popularity of the new command seen.
Figure A.3 illustrates how the popularity of a command inﬂuences the calculation. Popular commands receive minimal weight, assuming that it is more likely
for a user to suddenly start using a popular command rather than an unpopular
command. Notice from the calculation how a string of unpopular commands never
used by a user can drive the xu value in the negative direction.
The ﬁnal step involves a simple summation. This short toy problem has a
positive value, indicating an authentic user, which it is.
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a.

Tuple is: cpp, sh, xrdb, cpp, sh
3 distinct commands; user 1’s first 5
commands.

cpp

sh

xrdb

Nuk

38

394

38

nuk

2

2

1

Uk

45

49

43

Figure A.1: Step 1 of the toy problem

b.

Calculate Wuk for each command:
Consider cpp:
Wuk = (Nuk / Nu) / ∑uvuk
Wuk = (38 / 5000) / (2225 / 5000) = .01708
Notice from algorithm that if a distinct
command is not used, null effect…if
user never used command in training,
but it shows up in test data, Wuk = -1

cpp

sh

xrdb

Nuk

38

394

38

nuk

2

2

1

Uk

45

49

43

Wuk

.01708

.01809

.06518

Figure A.2: Step 2 of the toy problem
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c.

Let y = Wuk (1 – (Uk/U)) nuk (for notation)
Calculate y for each distinct command:
Consider cpp:
y = .01708 ( 1 – (45 / 50)) 2 = .00342
Notice from algorithm that if many users
use command, impact minimal…

cpp

sh

xrdb

Nuk

38

394

38

nuk

2

2

1

Uk

45

49

43

Wuk

.01708

.01809

.06518

y

.00342

.00072

.00913

Notice that although xrdb is only used
once, the impact is the most
significant…this is because xrdb is
more unique than other commands

Figure A.3: Step 3 of the toy problem

cpp

sh

xrdb

Nuk

38

394

38

nuk

2

2

1

Uk

45

49

43

Wuk

.01708

.01809

.06518

y

.00342

.00072

.00913

d.
xu = 1/5 (∑ y) = .002654

Figure A.4: Step 4 of the toy problem

APPENDIX B
RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC (ROC)
CURVES
B.1

The Confusion Matrix and Hypothesis Testing Deﬁnitions
Confusion matrices, ROC curves, and hypothesis testing have very much in

common. Many of the terms used with these tools are synonymous, and often these
terms are misunderstood. The below matrix which illustrates the four regions of a
typical hypothesis testing problem deﬁnes the applicable terms.
DECISION:
STATE OF
NATURE:

Reject H0
(Predict No Intrusion)

Do Not Reject H0
(Predict Intrusion)

H0 is False
(No Intrusion)

Good
Probability = 1 – β
Frequently called Power
(The medical community refers
to this as specificity.)

Bad – Type II Error
Probability = β
(This will be referred to as a
False Positive – medical
community often plots this on
the x axis as 1-specificity.)

H0 is True
(Intrusion)

Bad – Type I Error
Probability = α

Good
Probability = 1 – α
Frequently called Confidence
(This will be referred to as True
Positive when discussing ROC
curves; an alternative term is
sensitivity, typically used by
the medical community.)

Figure B.1: Hypothesis testing regions and terms
As seen in the above ﬁgure, there are numerous terms used to describe the
performance of a classiﬁcation system. The medical community uses only speciﬁcity
and sensitivity. For our purposes, we will use false positive and true positive.
The confusion matrix stems directly from the above discussion. A confusion
matrix represents the outcome of an attempt to classify known groups. When dealing
with an IDS, there are only two groups: intruders or non intruders. Therefore,
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a confusion matrix for an IDS would contain four regions, representing the four
potential types of classiﬁcation. The below confusion matrix illustrates this point.
PREDICTED:
0 (Negative)

1 (Positive)

0 (Negative)

a

b

1 (Positive)

c

d

ACTUAL:

Figure B.2: Hypothesis testing regions and terms
From a confusion matrix, one can calculate both the false positive rating and
the true positive rating. These calculations follow:

B.2

TRUE POSITIVE:

d
c+d

FALSE POSITIVE:

b
a+b

The ROC Curve
A Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve is a very complete, simple, and

elegant way to display the performance of a classiﬁcation system. An ROC curve is a
graphic representation of the relationship between the probability of a true positive
outcome (sensitivity, 1-α error) and the probability of a false positive outcome (Type
II error(β) or 1-speciﬁcity). The earliest use of ROC curves can be traced back to
World War II during initial implementation of radar systems. It was very important
for radar systems to accurately detect aircraft. Radar systems could be set to a very
high and sensitive level, where every aircraft would deﬁnitely be detected, however
this would result in a tremendous number of false positives. Imagine the number of
false air alarms that could have been sounded over Great Britain if the Allied Forces
did not carefully manage the sensitivity setting of their radar systems! ROC curves
represent reality, where perfect detection or classiﬁcation is usually not a possibility.
Users must determine classiﬁcation settings, depending on a cost-beneﬁt analysis of
what they are willing to accept as a true positive rating and a false positive rating.
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An ROC curve is a representation of the entire range of operating points that
a classiﬁcation system has the capability to attain, and typically the user has the
ﬂexibility to decide where to operate on the curve. The overall curve reﬂects the
quality of the classiﬁcation system. The Area under the curve (AUC) is typically
used as method of comparing alternate ROC curves; the better ROC curve typically
has more AUC.
Probability Density
Function of Legal
transactions

Probability Density
Function of Illegal
transactions

general threshhold, t, used to trigger IDS alarm

This t corresponds to a point on the ROC curve, perhaps here.

Figure B.3: The plot on the left shows the PDFs of legal and illegal
transactions (non intruders and intruders), respectively. The
ROC curve on the right shows the possible operating point
represented by the tolerance threshold shown on the PDF
plots.
The plot of the PDFs illustrates the idea of false positives and true positives.
The hashed area represents the probability of a true positive, and the small red area
represents a false positive. Imagine shifting the threshold, t, to the left. The true
positive rating would deﬁnitely increase, but so would the false positive. The user
must identify what point on the curve is acceptable, and this is usually accomplished
through a cost-beneﬁt analysis.

APPENDIX C
Perl Programs
C.1

Introduction to the Programs
This appendix contains the source code from the six primary Perl programs

that the calculations necessary to analyze both Schonlau’s algorithm and prediction
models using the new variables. The following table brieﬂy describes each program.
Table C.1: Description of Perl Programs
Name of Program
dictionarytrain

user popularity

algorithm debug

results analysis debug

features
601features

Description
This program analyzes each users initial
5000 commands and creates a data dictionary of distinct commands. This program
also determines the overall frequency and
popularity of commands.
This program determines the number of
time each user utilized each distinct command.
This program calculates Schonlau’s algorithm. The majority of variables from his
algorithm should look similar to the Perl
variables. This program creates a ﬁle that
contains the xu value for the 5000 tuples
of test data.
This program calculates the confusion matrices and data necessary to build the ROC
curve from Schonlau’s algorithm.
This program creates seven features for
each tuple of test data (5000 tuples).
This program creates 601 features for each
tuple of test data (5000 tuples).
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C.2

Source Code

C.2.1 The dictionarytrain program
open (traintotal,">traintotal"); open (trainvar,">trainvar"); $j=1;
@total=@_;
for($j=1;$j<51;$j++) #loops one time for each user (1-50)
{
$fh="user$j";
open $fh,"$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;
$i=0;
for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++)
{
$a=(5000*($j-1));
@total[$i+$a]=@all_lines[$i]
}
print traintotal @total;
length 250K

#saves every command as an array

}
$count=0; $a=1; $b=2; for ($i=0;$i<250000;$i++) {
if ($count==0)
#initiates cmd dictionary with first command
{
$count=count+1;
$k=$count-1;
$dictionary[$k][$a]=@total[$i];
$dictionary[$k][$b]=1;
}
$j=0;
$z=0;
for ($j=0;$j<$count;$j++)
#determines if cmd is already in
dictionary
{
if (@total[$i] eq $dictionary[$j][$a])
{
$dictionary[$j][$b]=($dictionary[$j][$b])+1;
$z=$z+1;
}
}
if ($z==0)
#if new cmd, adds to dictionary
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{
$count=$count+1;
$k=$count-1;
$dictionary[$k][$a]=@total[$i];
$dictionary[$k][$b]=1;
}
}
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<$count;$i++) {
chomp $dictionary[$i][$a];
print "$dictionary[$i][$a] $dictionary[$i][$b] \n";
}
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<$count;$i++) {
print trainvar "$dictionary[$i][$a],$dictionary[$i][$b]\n";
}
print "\n"; print "$count distinct commands."; print "\n";
$total=@total; print "$total total commands.\n"; print "\n";
open (traincmddict,">traincmddict"); open
(traincmdcount,">traincmdcount");
$i=1; for ($i=0;$i<$count;$i++) {
print traincmddict "$dictionary[$i][$a]\n";
print traincmdcount "$dictionary[$i][$a]\n";
}
##Below lines determine the popularity of the commands.
open (traincmddict,"traincmddict"); open (popular, ">popular"); open
(popvar,">popvar");
$j=1; @total=@_; @popularity=@_;
$k=0; for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++) {
@popularity[$k]=0;
}
for($j=1;$j<51;$j++)
$fh="user$j";
open $fh,"$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;

#loops one time for each user (1-50) {
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$i=0;
for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++)
{
$k=0;
$count=0;
for ($k=0;$j<635;$j++)
{
if (@all_lines[$i] eq @traincmddict[$j])
{
@popularity[$j]=@popularity[$j]+1;
$j=635;
}
}
}
}

$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print popular @popular[$i];
print popvar "@popularity[$i],\n";
}
C.2.2 The user popularity program
open (traincmddict,"traincmddict"); open (popular, ">popular"); open
(popvar,">popvar");
$j=1; @total=@_; @popularity=@_;
@traincmddict=<traincmddict>;
$k=0; for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++) {
@popularity[$k]=0;
}
for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++)
{
$usertraindict[$k][$i]=0;
}
}
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for($j=1;$j<51;$j++) #loops one time for each user (1-50) {
@counter=@_;
$fh="user$j";
open $fh,"$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;
$i=0;
for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++)
{
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++)
{
if (@all_lines[$i] eq @traincmddict[$k])
{
if (@counter[$k]!=1)
{
@popularity[$k]=@popularity[$k]+1;
@counter[$k]=1;
}
$usertraindict[$k][$j-1]=
$usertraindict[$k][$j-1]+1;
}
}
}
}
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print popular "@popularity[$i]";
print popvar "@popularity[$i]\n";
}
open (usertraindict,">usertraindict");
for ($i=0;$i<=50;$i++) {
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<635;$k++)
{
print usertraindict "$usertraindict[$k][$i]\n";
}
}
C.2.3 The algorithm debug program
$start=time(); print "Start time: $start\n"; open
(usertraindict,"usertraindict"); @utraintotal=<usertraindict>;
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$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<635;$j++)
{
$cmd=(635*$i)+$j;
$usertraindict[$j][$i]=@utraintotal[$cmd];
}
}
open (userpop,">userpop"); $i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<49;$j++)
{
chomp $usertraindict[$i][$j];
print userpop "$usertraindict[$i][$j],";
}
print userpop "$usertraindict[$i][49]";
}
$i=1; for ($i=1;$i<51;$i++) {
$fh="user$i";
open $fh, "$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;
$j=0;
for($j=0;$j<100;$j++)
{
$k=0;
for($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
$line=5000+(($j*100)+$k);
$testblock[$i-1][$j][$k]=@all_lines[$line];
#this nested loop creates 100 arrays of test data
for every user
}
}
} print "User test blocks complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n"; print "Now comparing test
blocks with user training dictionary...\n\n"; print @all_lines[0];
open (traincmddict,"traincmddict"); @traincmddict=<traincmddict>;
$i=1; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
@vk[$i]=0;
$j=0;
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for ($j=0;$j<100;$j++)
{
$l=0;
for($l=0;$l<635;$l++)
{
$nuk[$i][$l][$j]=0;
$wuk[$i][$l][$j]=-1;
$vuk[$l][$i]=0;
$modwuk[$i][$l][$j]=1;
}
$l=0;
for($l=0;$l<635;$l++)
{
$k=0;
for($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
if($testblock[$i][$j][$k] eq $traincmddict[$l])
{
$nuk[$i][$l][$j]=($nuk[$i][$l][$j])+1;
$vuk[$l][$i]=($usertraindict[$l][$i])/5000;
}
}
}
}
}
print "Test blocks analyzed against user training dictionary.\n";
$time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n"; print "Now computing
algorithm...\n";
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<50;$j++)
{
@vk[$i]=@vk[$i]+$vuk[$i][$j];
}
}
open (popvar,"popvar"); @userpopularity=<popvar>;
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
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for ($j=0;$j<100;$j++)
{
$l=0;
for($l=0;$l<635;$l++)
{
if(($vuk[$l][$i]==0) and ($nuk[$i][$l][$j]>0))
{
$modwuk[$i][$l][$j]=-1;
}
if($vuk[$l][$i]==0)
{
$wuk[$i][$l][$j]=-1;
}
if($vuk[$l][$i] > 0)
{
$wuk[$i][$l][$j]=$vuk[$l][$i]/@vk[$l];
}
$calcxu=.01*(($wuk[$i][$l][$j])*($nuk[$i][$l][$j])*
(1-(@userpopularity[$l]/50)));
$xu[$j][$i]=$xu[$j][$i]+$calcxu;
$modcalcxu=.01*(($modwuk[$i][$l][$j])*($nuk[$i][$l][$j])*
(1-(@userpopularity[$l]/50)));
$modxu[$j][$i]=$modxu[$j][$i]+$modcalcxu;
}
}
}
open (xu,">xu"); $i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
print xu "$xu[$k][$i]\n";
}
}
open (modxu,">modxu"); $i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
print modxu "$modxu[$k][$i]\n";
}
}
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print "Program complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n";
C.2.4 The results analysis debug program
$start=time(); print "Start time: $start\n";
open (xu,"xu"); @xu=<xu>; open
(masquerade_summary,"masquerade_summary.txt"); open
(masq_summary,">masq_summary"); print masq_summary
<masquerade_summary>; open (masq_summary,"masq_summary");
@trueresults=<masq_summary>;
open(trueresults,">trueresults");
print trueresults @trueresults;
$test=substr(@trueresults[99],1,1); print $test; #print
@trueresults[99];
@true=@_; $i=0; for($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
for($j=0;$j<100;$j++)
{
$cmd=(($i*100)+$j);
$length=$i*2;
@true[$cmd]=substr(@trueresults[$j],$length,1);
}
}
open(true,">true");
$i=0; for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++) {
print true "@true[$i]\n";
}
$i=0; $tolerance=-.25; for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++) {
if (@xu[$i]<$tolerance)
{
@testresult[$i]=1;
}
if (@xu[$i]>=$tolerance)
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{
@testresult[$i]=0;
}
}
$truepositive=0; $falsepositive=0; $falsenegative=0;
$truenegative=0; for ($i=0;$i<5000;$i++) {
if (@testresult[$i]==@true[$i])
{
@finalresult[$i]=1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]!=@true[$i])
{
@finalresult[$i]=0;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==1 && @true[$i]==1)
{
$truepositive=$truepositive+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==0 && @true[$i]==0)
{
$truenegative=$truenegative+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==1 && @true[$i]==0)
{
$falsepositive=$falsepositive+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==0 && @true[$i]==1)
{
$falsenegative=$falsenegative+1;
}
}
print "
predicted positive predicted negative"; print "\n";
print "actual positive
$truepositive $falsenegative\n"; print
"actual negative
$falsepositive $truenegative\n";
open (ROC,">ROC"); $j=0; for ($j=0;$j<1600;$j++) {
$i=.3;
$tolerance=-.8963+($j*.001);
for($i=0;$i<5000;$i++)
{
if (@xu[$i]<$tolerance)
{

54

@testresult[$i]=1;
}
if (@xu[$i]>=$tolerance)
{
@testresult[$i]=0;
}
}
$truepositive=0;
$falsepositive=0;
$falsenegative=0;
$truenegative=0;
for ($i=0;$i<5000;$i++)
{
if (@testresult[$i]==@true[$i])
{
@finalresult[$i]=1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]!=@true[$i])
{
@finalresult[$i]=0;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==1 && @true[$i]==1)
{
$truepositive=$truepositive+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==0 && @true[$i]==0)
{
$truenegative=$truenegative+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==1 && @true[$i]==0)
{
$falsepositive=$falsepositive+1;
}
if (@testresult[$i]==0 && @true[$i]==1)
{
$falsenegative=$falsenegative+1;
}
}
@truepositive[$j]=
($truepositive/($truepositive+$falsenegative));
@falsepositive[$j]=
($falsepositive/($truenegative+$falsepositive));
print ROC "@falsepositive[$j],@truepositive[$j]\n";
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}
print "Program complete.\n"; $time=(time()-$start)/60;
$time=sprintf("%.2f",$time);
print "Total elapsed time: $time min\n";
C.2.5 The features program
$start=time(); $now=time()-$start; print "Start time:

($now)\n";

open (unix_commands,"unix_commands.txt"); open (traincmddict,
"traincmddict"); @unix_commands=<unix_commands>;
@traincmddict=<traincmddict>; $i=0; @traindict_unix=@_; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
@dict_unix[$i]=0;
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<2006;$j++)
{
if (@traincmddict[$i] == @unix_commands[$j])
{
@traindict_unix[$i]=1;
$j=2007;
}
}
}
open (traindict_unix, ">traindict_unix"); $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print traindict_unix "@traindict_unix[$i]\n";
}
open (toptwenty,">toptwenty"); @toptwenty=@_; $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
@toptwenty[$i]=0;
}
@toptwenty[1]=1; @toptwenty[12]=1; @toptwenty[47]=1;
@toptwenty[35]=1; @toptwenty[26]=1; @toptwenty[59]=1;
@toptwenty[48]=1; @toptwenty[31]=1; @toptwenty[22]=1;
@toptwenty[25]=1; @toptwenty[139]=1; @toptwenty[36]=1;
@toptwenty[18]=1; @toptwenty[68]=1; @toptwenty[155]=1;
@toptwenty[175]=1; @toptwenty[15]=1; @toptwenty[32]=1;
@toptwenty[21]=1; @toptwenty[40]=1;
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open (internet_cmd,">internet_cmd"); @internet_cmd=@_; $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
@internet_cmd[$i]=0;
}
@internet_cmd[47]=1; @internet_cmd[59]=1;
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print internet_cmd "@internet_cmd[$i]\n";
}
$i=1; for ($i=1;$i<51;$i++) {
$fh="user$i";
open $fh, "$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;
$j=0;
for($j=0;$j<150;$j++)
{
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]=0;
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]=0;
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j]=0;
$uuniqueness[$i][$j]=0;
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]=0;
$uforeign[$i][$j]=0;
$k=0;
for($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
$line=(($j*100)+$k);
$datablock[$i-1][$j][$k]=@all_lines[$line];
#this nested loop creates 150 arrays of total data
for every user
}
}
}
open (popvar,"popvar"); @popvar=<popvar>; open
(trainfreq,"trainfreq.txt"); @trainfreq=<trainfreq>;
$i=0; $j=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<150;$j++)
{
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
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{
$z=0;
$l=0;
for ($l=0;$l<635;$l++)
{
if ($datablock[$i][$j][$k] eq @traincmddict[$l])
{
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]=@traindict_unix[$l]+
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j];
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]=@toptwenty[$l]+
$utoptwenty[$i][$j];
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j]=@internet_cmd[$l]+
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j];
$uuniqueness[$i][$j]=$uuniqueness[$i][$j]+
@popvar[$l];
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]=$utrainfreq[$i][$j]+
$trainfreq[$l];
$l=700;
$z=1;
}
if (($l==634) && ($z==0))
{
$uforeign[$i][$j]=$uforeign[$i][$j]+1;
}
}
}
}
}
$now=time()-$start; print "features created for all training
commands;\n"; print "now measuring against data; time elapsed:
$now sec\n";
open (true,"true"); @true=<true>; open
(featurematrix,">featurematrix"); open
(testfeaturematrix,">testfeaturematrix"); open (xu,"xu"); @xu=<xu>;
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<150;$j++)
{
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]=($utraindict_unix[$i][$j])/100;
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]=($utoptwenty[$i][$j])/100;
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j]=($uinternet_cmd[$i][$j])/100;
$uuniqueness[$i][$j]=(
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1-((50-($uuniqueness[$i][$j])/100))/100);
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]=($utrainfreq[$i][$j])/100;
$uforeign[$i][$j]=($uforeign[$i][$j])/100;
$id=((101+$i)*1000)+($j+1);
if ($j<50)
{
print featurematrix "$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j] $uuniqueness[$i][$j]
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]
$uforeign[$i][$j]
0
$id\n";
}
if ($j>=50)
{
$result=($i*100)+($j-50);
chomp @true[$result];
chomp @xu[$result];
print featurematrix "$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j] $uuniqueness[$i][$j]
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]
$uforeign[$i][$j]
@true[$result] $id\n";
print testfeaturematrix "$utraindict_unix[$i][$j]
$utoptwenty[$i][$j]
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j] $uuniqueness[$i][$j]
$utrainfreq[$i][$j]
$uforeign[$i][$j]
@xu[$result]
@true[$result] $id\n";
}
}
}
$now=time()-$start; print "program complete; time elapsed:
sec\n";
C.2.6 The 601features program
$start=time(); $now=time()-$start; print "Start time:

$now

($now)\n";

open (unix_commands,"unix_commands.txt"); open (traincmddict,
"traincmddict"); @unix_commands=<unix_commands>;
@traincmddict=<traincmddict>; $i=0; @traindict_unix=@_; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
$dict_unix[$i]=0;
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$j=0;
for ($j=0;$j<2006;$j++)
{
if ($traincmddict[$i] == $unix_commands[$j])
{
$traindict_unix[$i]=1;
$j=2007;
}
}
}
open (traindict_unix, ">traindict_unix"); $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print traindict_unix "$traindict_unix[$i]\n";
}
open (toptwenty,">toptwenty"); @toptwenty=@_; $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
$toptwenty[$i]=0;
}
$toptwenty[1]=1; $toptwenty[12]=1; $toptwenty[47]=1;
$toptwenty[35]=1; $toptwenty[26]=1; $toptwenty[59]=1;
$toptwenty[48]=1; $toptwenty[31]=1; $toptwenty[22]=1;
$toptwenty[25]=1; $toptwenty[139]=1; $toptwenty[36]=1;
$toptwenty[18]=1; $toptwenty[68]=1; $toptwenty[155]=1;
$toptwenty[175]=1; $toptwenty[15]=1; $toptwenty[32]=1;
$toptwenty[21]=1; $toptwenty[40]=1;
open (internet_cmd,">internet_cmd"); @internet_cmd=@_; $i=0; for
($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
$internet_cmd[$i]=0;
}
$internet_cmd[47]=1; $internet_cmd[59]=1;
$i=0; for ($i=0;$i<635;$i++) {
print internet_cmd "$internet_cmd[$i]\n";
}
$i=1; for ($i=1;$i<51;$i++) {
$fh="user$i";
open $fh, "$fh";
@all_lines=<$fh>;
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$j=0;
for($j=0;$j<150;$j++)
{
$k=0;
for($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
$line=(($j*100)+$k);
$datablock[$i-1][$j][$k]=@all_lines[$line];
#this nested loop creates 150 arrays of total data
for every user
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j][$k]=0;
$utoptwenty[$i][$j][$k]=0;
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j][$k]=0;
$uuniqueness[$i][$j][$k]=0;
$utrainfreq[$i][$j][$k]=0;
$uforeign[$i][$j][$k]=0;
}
}
}
open (popvar,"popvar"); @popvar=<popvar>; open
(trainfreq,"trainfreq.txt"); @trainfreq=<trainfreq>;
$i=0; $j=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=0;
for ($j=50;$j<150;$j++)
{
$k=0;
for ($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
$z=0;
$l=0;
for ($l=0;$l<635;$l++)
{
if ($datablock[$i][$j][$k] eq $traincmddict[$l])
{
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j][$k]=$traindict_unix[$l];
$utoptwenty[$i][$j][$k]=$toptwenty[$l];
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j][$k]=$internet_cmd[$l];
$uuniqueness[$i][$j][$k]=$popvar[$l];
$utrainfreq[$i][$j][$k]=$trainfreq[$l];
$l=700;
$z=1;
}
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if (($l==634) && ($z==0))
{
$uforeign[$i][$j][$k]=1;
}
}
}
}
}
$now=time()-$start; print "features created for all training
commands;\n"; print "now measuring against data; time elapsed:
sec\n";
open (true,"true"); @true=<true>; open (sevenC,">sevenC"); open
(xu,"xu"); @xu=<xu>; $i=0; for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) {
$j=50;
for ($j=50;$j<150;$j++)
{
$id=((101+$i)*1000)+($j+1);
$id=((101+$i)*1000)+($j+1);
if ($j>=50)
{
$result=($i*100)+($j-50);
chomp @true[$result];
chomp @xu[$result];
$x=@xu[$result];
$x=$x*1;
$k=0;
@a=@_;
$b=$_;
for ($k=0;$k<100;$k++)
{
$uuniqueness[$i][$j][$k]=
1*$uuniqueness[$i][$j][$k];
$utrainfreq[$i][$j][$k]=
1*$utrainfreq[$i][$j][$k];
$c=1*$utrainfreq[$i][$j][$k];
$utraindict_unix[$i][$j][$k]=
1*$utraindict_unix[$i][$j][$k];
$utoptwenty[$i][$j][$k]=
1*$utoptwenty[$i][$j][$k];
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j][$k]=
1*$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j][$k];
$uforeign[$i][$j][$k]=

$now
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1*$uforeign[$i][$j][$k];
$a[$k]=join (" ",$utraindict_unix[$i][$j][$k],
$utoptwenty[$i][$j][$k],
$uinternet_cmd[$i][$j][$k],
$uuniqueness[$i][$j][$k],$c,
$uforeign[$i][$j][$k]);
#print "@a[$k]\n";
}
$b=join (" ",@a);
print sevenC "$b
$xu[$result]
$true[$result] $id\n";
}
}
}
$now=time()-$start; print "program complete; time elapsed:
sec\n";

$now

